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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from a breach of contract case filed in the district court involving a
written marital settlement agreement. Appellant, Sondra Kantor (hereinafter, "Sondra") and
Respondent, Robert Kantor (hereinafter, "Robert"), were divorced on April 30, 2012 in a
separate cause of action, Kantor v. Kantor, Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-525. The divorce
decree was entered following a written Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") entered between
the parties on or about April 25, 2012. The PSA, among other things, contained essential tenns
related to property and debt division, the sale of the community residence and the parties'
respective interests in certain business entities. At the time of the divorce, the parties had been
married for 43 years.
The PSA was neither submitted to the magistrate court nor merged at the time the Decree
of Divorce was entered in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-525. Sondra filed a motion with
the magistrate to merge the PSA into a supplemental decree on October 18, 2013, which was
subsequently granted at a hearing on December 20, 2013. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce
was entered on December 20, 2013 nunc pro tune for October 18, 2013. The merger occurred
during the midst of the district court litigation, which was initiated on October 11, 2012.
The district court action was initially filed by Robert as a breach of contract case seeking
damages and injunctive relief for Sondra's initial failure to sign a single document necessary to
extend a "short sale" of the parties' luxury home in Sun Valley, Idaho. A jury trial was
requested by Robert. The PSA provided that the former community residence was to be sold "as
soon as reasonably possible." Sondra filed various (and potentially compulsory) counterclaims
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that alleged Robert had likewise violated the PSA.
The case came on for partial summary judgment and the district court granted Robert's
motion in certain aspects. The district court permitted Sondra to amend her counterclaim to
include new and clarified claims against Robert including, among other things, Sondra's
counterclaim that Robert was in breach of the PSA for his failure to complete the short sale
process on the community residence. Robert's breach revolved around his pursuit of a principal
loan reduction program that preempted the continuation of the short sale process.
To complete his application for a loan modification, Robert contended that he needed
Sondra to convey her interest to him in a recorded quitclaim deed. Sondra sold her interest to her
boyfriend, Al LaPeter (hereinafter, "LaPeter"). The district court subsequently ordered that
Sondra obtain a deed back from LaPeter and convey the property to Robert or else she would be
sanctioned. Sondra was unable to comply as LaPeter refused to sell the interest back to Sondra.
The matter came on for cross-motions to dismiss. Robert asked the district court to
dismiss Sondra's case as a sanction. Sondra asked the district court to dismiss following the
merger of the PSA on jurisdictional grounds. The Court granted both motions and ordered the
case to be dismissed on concurrent grounds. With regard to the sanction, the district court ruled
the dismissal was "without prejudice to Sondra's pursuing these same claims (raised in her
district court counterclaim) before Judge Borreson in magistrate's court. This dismissal is a bar,
and is with prejudice, to Sondra raising any of these same claims in district court as a breach of
contract action with a claim for money damages, with or without a claim for a right of trial by
jury." (Emphasis in original). The district court also awarded Robert attorney fees and costs in
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amount of$19,334.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A

\Vhether the District Court had and maintained jurisdiction over the case

and the real property.
B.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions

against Sondra Kantor.
C.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Robert.

D.

Whether the District Court erred in detennining Robert Kantor was the

prevailing party and awarding attorney fees and costs to Robert Kantor.

III. ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V
A. Involuntary Dismissal as a Sanction under Inherent Authority.
This is a case of first impression in Idaho. Under Idaho law, the courts have authority to
sanction a party in a variety of circumstances. Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 732, 747
P.2d 752, 754 (1987) (discussing options for sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11, 16, 37 and 41); see

also, I.R.C.P. 75, I.C. §§ 7-610, et seq. The district court stated it was dismissing Sondra's case
under its inherent authority and did not otherwise identify a specific rule in its decision. The
dismissal as a sanction stemmed from Sondra's inability to comply with the district court's order
to get a deed back from LaPeter.
B. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

As an alternate ground for dismissal of the remaining claims, the district court granted
Sondra's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed by her pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) based on a lack
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of subject matter jurisdiction once the PSA was merged into a Supplemental Decree of Divorce
in Blaine County Case No.CV-2011-525. A dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b) for lack of
jmisdiction is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. Owsley v. Idaho

Industrial Com 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005). On a motion to dismiss, the
Court may look only at the pleadings and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. If the Court looks beyond the pleadings, the Court should employ the same standard as
used in summary judgment proceedings. Thomson v. City o_fLewiston, 137 Idaho 473,476, 50
P.3d 488, 491 (2002).
C. Summary Judgment
When reviewing a case decided on summary judgment by the district court, the Idaho
Appellate Courts use the same standard that the district court used in ruling on the motion.

Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,907,332 P.3d 815,819 (2014). Summary judgment
is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court should construe disputed
facts and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in the non-moving party's favor. Fuller

v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011).
D. Prevailing Party/Attorney Fees
"In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B). The detennination
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who is a prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Advanced A1ed. Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. of

Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 814, 303 P.3d 171, 173 (2013). "A trial court also has discretion to
determine that there is no overall prevailing party." Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 359, 179
P.3d 316, 322 (2008). "In detennining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims
and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the action.'
That is, the prevailing party question is examined and detennined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idaho 716,719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005).

E. Abuse of Discretion
To detennine whether a trial court abused its discretion, the Appellate Court considers:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise ofreason. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450, 457
(2003).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGFULLY ENGAGED IN REWRITING THE

PSA AND IN ASSERTING JURISDICTION OVER THE REAL PROPERTY.
Sondra acknowledges that the district court is a court of general jurisdiction. Troupis v.

Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79,218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009); Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 20. However,
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is a distinction between the jurisdictional power to act and the authority to act in the
manner the court did. Richardson v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, 98 P. 842, 845 (1908).
1.

Additional factual background.

The district court was presiding over a breach of contract case set for jury trial involving
a written marital settlement agreement. R., Vol. I, pp. 13-18. When the action was initiated the
PSA was a stand-alone contract. The PSA was neither submitted to the magistrate court nor
merged at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered in Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-525.
R., Vol. I, pp. 26-27. The Decree of Divorce stands silent as to the issue of merger. R., Vol. I, p.
26. The PSA contained a clause that either party could ask the court to incorporate the PSA into
a supplemental decree. R., Vol. I, p. 39, ,I 24. Sondra filed a motion with the magistrate to merge
the PSA in to a supplemental decree on October 18, 2013, which was subsequently granted at a
hearing on December 20, 2013. R., Vol. V, p. 935, i1 l. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce was
entered on December 20, 2013 nunc pro tune for October 1(8], 2013. R., Vol. V, p. 1034, il 2.
At the time of the parties' divorce settlement, Robert was living in the parties' luxury
12,000 square foot community residence located in Sun Valley, Idaho. Tr., Vol. I, p. 130, I. 6 p. 131, 1. 9. The monthly payments in the amount of approximately$ 14,000 per month had not
been made since September 2011 and the first mortgage and a Home Equity Line of Credit
("HELOC") were severely delinquent. R., Vol. III., p. 596; R., Vol. IV, p. 826, ,I 4. The parties
agreed that the residence was to be sold "as soon as reasonably possible". R., Vol. I, p. 33, ,I 5.
The parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase and Sales Agreement to sell the residence to third
party buyers, Mr. and Mrs. August, on a short sale for the sum of $2,400,000, which agreement
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was signed by Robert on September 24, 2012 and Sondra on September 26, 2012. R., Vol. I, pp.
52-58. The parties were asked to sign a document extending the closing date. R., Vol. I, p. 246.
Prior to signing the extension document, Sondra sent Robe1i an e-mail asking for his compliance
with various aspects of the PSA. R., Vol. I, pp. 248-50.
On October 11, 2012, Robert filed a Complaint with the Blaine County District Court
alleging that Sondra had breached the PSA and further seeking injunctive relief to compel her
cooperation with a short sale on the parties' former community residence. R., Vol. I, pp. 13-18.
Sondra signed the necessary document to extend the closing on the short sale that same day and
delivered it to the realtor within two hours of the Complaint being filed. R., Vol. I, p. 246.
Sondra was not even served with the Complaint and related documents until October 22, 2012.
R., Vol. I, p. 75, but admitted in her deposition that she had initially withheld her signature to get
Robert's compliance with other aspects of the PSA. R., Vol. I, p. 202, LL 1-10. Despite Sondra's
acquiescence, Robert proceeded with the litigation as evidenced by serving her 11 days later. R.,
Vol. I, p. 75.
Sondra filed her initial Answer and Counterclaim on November 21, 2012 asserting her
own claims against Robert for various breaches of the PSA. R., Vol. I, pp. 76-86.

Sondra

believed her actions were necessary once Robert continued to pursue his case because her claims
may have been compulsory counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13. Robert moved for partial summary
judgment on March 19, 2013, R., Vol. I, pp. 170-72, which was heard on June 23, 2013 in
conjunction with Sondra's Motion for Leave to Amend. R., Vol. II, pp. 260-61. The district
court entered an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Robert. R., Vol. II, pp.
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454-55.

On August 9, 2013, Sondra filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim alleging

additional claims and clarified claims against Robert for breaches of the PSA. R., Vol. III, pp.
560-73.
That initial short sale failed because Bank of America failed to complete an appraisal and
through no fault of Sondra's. R., Vol. II, p. 331, (p. 14, LL 11-21). The parties thereafter revived
the short sale process and entered into a second real estate purchase and sale agreement with the
Augusts in February 2013. R., Vol. II, p. 331, (p. 15, 1. 5- p. 16, I. 18). Both parties signed the
necessary documents for the second short sale. R., Vol. II, p. 331, (p. 15, I. 19- p. 16, l. 4) Bank
of America approved the second short sale. R., Vol. II, pp. 400-04. However, the process was
again terminated by Bank of America in April 2013 because Robert was pursuing a principal
loan reduction with Bank of America simultaneously and unbeknownst to Sondra and the Bank
of America Short Sale Department. R., Vol. II, pp. 332(p. 19, 1. 9 - p. 20, I. 11), p. 406. The
bank's internal policies do not permit proceeding under both programs at the same time. 1 Id.
As a result of a Department of Justice program, the parties' HELOC for approximately
one million dollars was completely forgiven. R., Vol. III, p. 591; R., Vol. IV, pp. 873-75, ifi17-9.

1 At the time the Kantors were going through their divorce, Bank of America was the subject of a
federal action brought by the Department of Justice. R., Vol. V, pp. 954-60. The short sale and
loan modification programs at issue stem from a Consent Judgment entered into by Bank of
America with the Department of Justice and filed April 4, 2012 in the United States District of
Columbia Case No. CV-2012-0361, which sets forth the parameters for a settlement fund. R.,
Vol. V, pp. 950-79. Essentially, Bank of America and an assembly of other major lenders
admitted that there had been some impropriety in certain business practices in the lending
industry and agreed to settle with their clients and all fifty states. To fund the settlement, the
Banks agreed to repay some injured parties cash settlements and, in addition, the banks including Bank of America, agreed to provide "Consumer Relief' to its qualifying customers by
way ofloan forgiveness, restructured payments and interest, etc. Id.
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Robert continued to pursue the loan modification process in his name only to the exclusion of the
short sale process. R., Vol. III, p. 588,

ir 2; p.

593; p. 656,

~

4.

Sondra objected and called Bank

of America to let them know she wanted to complete the short sale process with the Augusts and
get out from under the debt and potential tax liability. Tr., Vol. I, p. 153, I. 13

p. 156, I. 1. The

parties filed additional cross-motions for preliminary injunctions in August 2013. Robert sought
to enjoin Sondra from contacting Bank of America. R., Vol. III, p. 600. Sondra sought to enjoin
Robert from pursuing a loan modification. R., Vol. III, p. 600.
Those motions came on for hearing before the district court on September 12, 2013. Tr.,
Vol. I, pp. 94-178. Throughout that hearing, the district court made several references about
restructuring the parties' contract. Tr., Vol. I, p. 100, LI. 1-3; p. 101, LL 15-17; p. 107, I. 7

p.

108, I. 12; p. 117, I. 18 - p. 118, I. 22; 95-109, Tr. pp. 117-118. For example, the district court
asked "If [Robert] gets [the mortgage] reduced to a million five, does he want to keep it?" Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 101, LI. 15-17. The district court's interest was piqued by certain information provided
to it regarding extraordinary debt forgiveness during the summary judgment process. Tr., Vol. I,
p. 40, I. 6 - p. 43, I. 24. Sondra testified both as to her contact with Bank of America and her
reasoning behind objecting to the loan modification process including her trepidation about the
tax consequences if the loan were restructured. Tr., Vol. I, p. 164, I. 24 - p. 168, I. 19. Fearing
that the district court would allow Robert to pursue the loan modification indefinitely, Sondra
stipulated that she would have no further contact with Bank of America and Robert could pursue
the loan modification until the jury trial, which was scheduled about four months later in January
2014. Tr., Vol. I, p. 174, I. 2 - p. 175, 1. 15. Both parties withdrew their request for injunctive
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The stipulation and the resulting order did not require Sondra to convey her interest to
Robert or cooperate in any manner with the loan modification but did state that both parties were
precluded from bringing fmiher requests for injunctive relief through the trial. R., Vol. III, pp.
659-60.
Shortly after the hearing, Robert took the position that Bank of America required Sondra
to transfer the property to him via Quitclaim Deed in order for him to pursue the loan
modification and filed yet another request for injunctive relief. R., Vol. III, p. 653. The deed was
not to be held in escrow but was to be actually recorded. Id. The transfer was to be completed
without any guaranty that Robert would qualify for the loan modification or that Sondra would
be released from the primary mortgage, which had a balance of approximately $3,600,000 at the
time. Tr., Vol. I, p. 164, I. 24- p. 168, I. 19. This was a principal loan reduction not a refinance
and would not have the guaranty of releasing Sondra from liability on the loan. R., Vol. IV, p.
770, ,i,r 28-29; R., Vol. V, p. 1014, I. 33 - p. 1015, I. 33. By this time, no mortgage payments
had been made for over two years and the loan was several hundred thousand dollars delinquent.
R., Vol. IV, p. 826. Sondra declined Robert's request to deed him the property without being
released from the loan and without knowing the tax consequences. R., Vol. IV, pp. 766-773, ,i,r
21-34. Robert assured her that he would deed the property back to her if the modification failed,
which Sondra did not believe in the first instance but more importantly Sondra did not want to be
a part of any fraud upon the bank by entering into a "secret" agreement with Robert that would
not be disclosed to Bank of America. Sondra insisted on full disclosure and verification that the
deed was necessary. Id.
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Fearful of Robert's further actions regardless of her concerns or the consequences,
Sondra sold her interest in the property to LaPeter for $100. R., Vol. IV, p. 768, ,i 24. Her
interest was still subject to the mortgage debt at the time of the transfer to LaPeter. Id. The
quitclaim deed to LaPeter was recorded on October 10, 2013. R., Vol. IV, p. 738. As it turned
out, her fears were well founded.
The Motion to Compel Recording of Deed recording came on for hearing on November
15, 2013. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 199-237. After considering argument, the district court ruled that
Sondra was required to obtain a deed back from LaPeter and was further required to deliver a
deed to Robert. Tr., Vol. I, p. 225, I. 3

p. 237, I. 5. 751-3; R., Vol. IV, pp. 751-53. Even though

the evidence before the district court established there was already a willing and able buyer, the
district court determined the loan modification would facilitate a sale that might generate a profit
even though there was no evidence of that at all in the record. Id. Sondra unsuccessfully tried to
get LaPeter to deed the property back to her but nevertheless did deliver a deed to Robert from
her conveying whatever interest she might have by the November 18, 2013 deadline. R., Vol. IV,
p. 738. Robert filed a Motion for Contempt on November 19, 2013. R., Vol. IV, pp. 733-750. In
response, the district court sent the first of two e-mails to counsel. R., Vol. IV, pp. 755-57. In so
doing, the district court summarily dismissed the contempt proceedings and threatened Sondra
with sanctions. R., Vol. IV, p. 756.
In response to the Court's e-mail, Sondra filed a responsive affidavit that addressed, inter

alia, her concerns about the loan modification. R., Vol. IV, pp. 766-773,
court responded with a second e-mail. R., Vol. IV, pp. 792-93.
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,r,r 21-34.

The district

Robert filed an additional

affidavit in support of a request for sanctions. R., Vol. IV, pp. 794-95. The court asked Sondra to
submit additional evidence and briefing, which she did. R., Vol. IV, pp. 841-906. A telephonic
hearing was conducted on December 10, 2013. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 239-66. At the conclusion of that
hearing, the district court postponed the imposition of sanctions and permitted Sondra to have
contact with the Bank of America to investigate the loan modification process and the need for
her to convey the property to Robert. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 259-61. The December 10, 2013 hearing
resulted in the Order Regarding Proposed Imposition of Sanctions. R., Vol. IV, pp. 907-11.
Thereafter the parties and counsel conducted a conference call with a Bank of America
representative that verified that the quitclaim deed was not required of the Kantors to participate
in the loan modification process. R., Vol. V, p. 1018, I. 28

p. 1020, 1. 12. The quitclaim deed

was, however, necessary to complete Robert's application because he had applied in his name
only for the loan modification. R., Vol. V, p. 1014, L. 22; R., Vol. V, p. 1023, LI. 14-22. It was
also revealed that Robert had delivered the (albeit ineffective) deed from Sondra to Robert dated
November 18, 2013 to Bank of America. R., Vol. V, p. 1020, I. 28 -p. 1020, LI. 27-29; p. 1021,
LL 22-25. Robert told Bank of America that Sondra had previously transferred her interest to
LaPeter, which was again verified by counsel. R., Vol. V, p. 1024, LI. 20-24. Nevertheless,
Bank of America was processing the loan modification application and no further deed was
required by the bank. R., Vol. V, p. 1024, LI. 27-32. While no determination had been made on
the Kantor loan, the bank representative stated that in her experience the loan reductions ranged
from $30,000 to $200,000. R., Vol. V, p. 1024, LI. 13-15.
Sondra informed the district court of these developments. R., Vol. V, pp. 985-89. Robert
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submitted an additional affidavit urging the district court to impose its sanctions pursuant to the
December 10, 2013 order. R., Vol. V, pp. 1030-31. During this same time frame, the magistrate
court had ruled on the merger question in the original divorce case, Blaine County CV-2011-525,
and merged the PSA into a Supplemental Decree on December 20, 2013. Sondra filed a Afotion

to Dismiss the district court case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) based on the merger of the PSA. R.,
Vol. V, pp. 934-37. That matter came on for hearing on January 13, 2014. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 267325. The district court dismissed the case. Tr., Vol. I, p. 314, 1. 8

p. 324, 1. 9. Sondra moved

for written findings of fact and the district court issued its Memorandum Order Dismissing

Defendant's Counterclaim and Judgment on January 23, 2014. R., Vol. V, pp. 1044-1052.
Sondra filed a timely appeal. R., Vol. V, p. 1053.
Thereafter the parties filed cross-motions for attorney fees and costs, which were heard
by the district court on April 7, 2014. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 3-71 2 . The district court awarded Robert
attorney fees in the amount of $19,334. Supp.R., Vol. I, pp. 131-32 3. That issue is also the
subject of this appeal.
2.

The PSA said sell the property "as soon as reasonably possible."

When interpreting a contract, the Court starts with the document. City of Meridian v.

Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425,435, 299 P.3d 232,242 (2013). Unless the document is ambiguous, it
shall be construed in "plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from
the plain wording of the instrument." Id. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract and

2 Transcript

of hearing on Motion for Fees by Sabrina Vasquez filed September 10, 2014
(hereinafter "Tr., Vol. II."
3 Supplemental Record, Volume 1 of 1 dated September 10, 2014 (hereinafter "Supp.R. ")
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detennining whether such a contract has been breached are questions of law subject to free
review. Id.
The intent of the parties regarding a sale is clearly expressed in the PSA, which provides,
in pertinent part:
5.

Real Property:

The parties own real property located at 265

Golden Eagle Drive, Hailey, Idaho.
5.01

This real property shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible.

5.02

Pending the sale or disposition of this real property, Robert shall

maintain the property and pay all utilities provided to the property. Any
capital improvements will be paid one half by each party. Capital
improvements will only be made if agreed upon by both parties in
,\Titing or ordered by the court.
5.03

Each party shall provide to the other any infonnation either party

receives that may be relevant to the ownership, sale, rental or other
disposition of said property.
R., Vol. I, p. 33, ,I 5.
Like many other divorce cases, the property was to be sold as soon as reasonably possible
to get out from under the debt. There was throughout the litigation a willing buyer in play that
wanted to buy the property. R., Vol. III, p. 608-09, ,Ii13-5; R., Vol. IV, p. 860-63; p. 865, ,i,i 4-6.
The Augusts were cash purchasers and had the financial ability to perform. R., Vol. IV, p. 865, ,i
6. Bank of America had previously approved the short sale the second time around and it was
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tenninated by Robert's pursuit of the loan modification. R., Vol. II, pp. 400, 406. It is not
Sondra that should have been facing the sanctions but rather Robert for not completing the
opportunity for the short sale that had been proposed for the year leading up to the dismissal of
the case. Id.
Despite being repeatedly confronted with these facts, the district court persisted in
approving Robert's pursuit of the loan modification.

At the core of Sondra's argument is the

district court was wrongfully engaged in modifying the PSA to indulge Robert's request for a
loan modification.

The district court has no "roving power to rewrite contracts". City of

A1eridian, 154 Idaho at 437, 299 P.3d at 244; Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho
619, 631, 249 P .3d 812, 824 (2011) (Justice Eismann, dissent); Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho
219,223, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009); Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185,
191, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (2005) Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93
P.3d 685, 693 (2004); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684, 760
P.2d 19, 23 (1988).
The district court even expressly recognized this fundamental precept in ruling against
Sondra on the credit card debt issue and stated, "Courts cannot make better contracts for parties
than they make for themselves." Tr., Vol. I, p. 55, Ll. 6-10. Nevertheless in the context of the
loan modification, the district court asked "why am I trying to force what's apparently in her best
interest on her? ... I am trying to get something done for both sides ... " Tr., Vol. I, p. 214, LI.
5-17. The district court later noted "If [Robert] is able to do a loan modification and if the Court
forces this on [Sondra] against her will, there's no reason it should have an unequal benefit." Tr.,
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I,p.216,Ll.

10.

The district court rationalized its actions, as follows:

And the way I look at this, it's facilitating a sale.

If there's a loan

reduction that works to the benefit of both parties, that then there can be a sale,
and there can be a sale with a benefit to each, a cash benefit to each.
Right now if I order a sale, and that's the bridge I crossed in the same
hearing a few months ago, if I order a sale, there's no benefit -well the parties get
excused from the debt, the property is gone, {f I ordered a short sale. There's
been a buyer apparently interested for quite some time.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 221, Ll. 8-18.
Sondra acknowledges and does not question the district court's power to enforce its own
valid orders. I.C. § 1-1603. This Court and our state court system is empowered to adopt any
suitable process or mode of proceeding that is "most confonnable to the spirit of this [Idaho]
code". I.C. § 1-1622. However, this general grant of authority to the Courts is not boundless.

See, e.g., Jvfatter of Adoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 558, 887 P.2d 1061, 1065 (1995)
(holding the court could not invent a procedure to perform adult adoptions); Twin Falls County v.

Cities o_f Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 146 P.3d 664 (2006) (holding that district court
panel exceeded its authority by ordering cities to reimburse county for facilities).

\Vhere a

statute or rule does not prescribe a procedure, the common law or other appropriate method may
be used to implement inherent judicial power. JI. Case Co. v. lvfcDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 230,
280 P.2d 1070, 1074 (1955). At common law, breach of contract cases typically call for only
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(monetary) damages designed to give the injured party the benefit of the contract had it
been performed. Hull v. Geisler, 156 Idaho 765, 775, 331 P.3d 507, 517 (2014). Among the
damages claimed by both parties in their respective efforts to compel the other's performance
were $300,000 to $400,000 in tax liability and forgiveness in the deficiency in the amount of
Sl,438,263.41, both of which were completely avoidable through the short sale process. R., Vol.
I, p. 16; R., Vol. I, pp. 333 (p. 25, Ll. 11-16); R., Vol. II, p. 402; R., Vol. III, pp. 567-68,

23-

31. See, Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 21,278 P.3d 415,423 (2012) (holding
damages must be reasonably certain and not purely speculative).
3.

Equity did not permit the district court to order the conveyance of any

interest in the real property -let alone for the purposes of a loan modification.
In the proceedings below, Robert had asserted only a claim for breach of contract for
Sondra's failure to complete the short sale and injunctive relief related thereto. R., Vol. I, pp. 1319. Sondra subsequently counterclaimed for the exact same relief against Robert regarding the
second short sale. R., Vol. III, pp. 566-68,

,r,r

17-31 "A right provided by contract is, by

definition, legal and not equitable." Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443, 447, 860 P.2d 646, 650
(1993). Robert later contended this contractual clause was obliterated by the September 12, 2013
agreement. R., Vol. IV, pp. 737-38,

~,r 5-6.

However, the PSA should not be disregarded based

solely on the September 12, 2013 hearing and the stipulation. Young Electric Sign Co. v. Winder,
135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P.3d 117, 121 (2001). The stipulation and resulting order does not
indicate in any form that Sondra would be required to relinquish her interest in the property or go
to any length to pursue the loan modification. R., Vol. III, p. 659-60; Tr., Vol. I, p. 174, 1. 2-p.
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1. 15; Tr., Vol.

p. 56,

5-8.

attempted stipulation is ineffective when it is clear

from the record that the parties never assented to it." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,
898, 204 P.3d 532, 538 (Ct.App. 2009) (citing Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d
1149, 1154 (2002) ). In fact, equity should dictate the opposite outcome in this case. Robert
should be judicially estopped from altering his position in the litigation from demanding a sale to
that of pursuing a loan modification at all costs. Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 900, 204 P.3d at 540;
Tr., Vol. I, p. 308, 1. 17 - p. 309, 1. 2. To require her to give up her interest in the property was
neither reasonable nor warranted.

As Sondra unsuccessfully argued to the district court, the

district court is not in the real estate business and had no reason to try and interfere to generate a
doubtful profit. R., Vol. IV, p. 767, ,i 23.
Equitable principles may cause a court to intervene if the tenns of the contract are
unconscionable as a result of a party's necessity or weakness. Losee, 148 Idaho at 223, 220 P.3d
579; Bakker, 141 Idaho at 191, 108 P.3d at 338. It is not enough if the court merely views the
terms as unwise or harsh in their enforcement. Id. For a contractual term to be unconscionable
and, thus, voidable, the term in question must be both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41-42, 72 P.3d 877, 88182 (2003).

Robert was living in a luxury 12,000 square foot home without having made a

mortgage payment in over three years. His loss of such gracious accommodations through a
short sale of the property was not "unconscionable".
Assuming arguendo that the district court was sitting as a court of equity, the broad
powers of equity should not permit the court to adjudicate claims the parties have not even
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asserted in their pleadings. I.R.C.P. 54(c); 1vf.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349,
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). Robert advanced no claims to quiet title under I.C. §§ 6-401, et

seq. R., Vol. I, pp. 13-19. There were no claims to partition the property by sale under I.C. §§ 6501, et seq. Id. Cases of such a nature would clearly invoke the court's power over the real
property itself. The only equitable claims that may be reasonably inferred from the proceedings
below relate to specific perfonnance of the contractual clause to sell the property. Kessler v.

Tortoise Dev., Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Both parties sought injunctive
relief to compel the other to comply with the short sale process. It was completely unnecessary
and was error on the part of the district court to attempt to assert jurisdiction over the property to
"facilitate a sale" by ordering Sondra to transfer her interest in the property to Robert to pursue a
loan modification. Tr., Vol. I, p. 221, Ll. 8-18. Similar to Hull v. Geisler, the district court's
remedies (albeit well intentioned) went "beyond the contract" and were improper. Hull, 156
Idaho at 779-80, 331 P.3d at 521-22.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING THE

MANNER OF SANCTIONS IT DID AGAINST SONDRA.
The district court acknowledged that it could not likely hold Sondra in contempt but
indicated that it could nonetheless sanction her under general authority. R., Vol. IV, p. 756; Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 254, 1. 11 - p. 256, 1. 16. This case is a matter of first impression as it pertains to the
court's "inherent judicial power" in the arena of dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply
with a court order. I.C. § 1-1622 accord JI. Case Co., 76 Idaho at 230,280 P.2d at 1074. This
Court has recognized and addressed the power of the courts to sanction on prior occasions. See,
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e.g., Fitzgerald, 113 Idaho at 732-33, 747 P.2d at 754-55.
Those powers are generally prescribed by rule or statute and not at common law, which
has also sought to define inherent authority. See, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111
S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (holding that the federal courts could use its inherent power
to assess attorney fees despite the existence of other valid procedural rules on point), contra Bank
of Nova Scotia v. US., 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (holding that the
court could not use its supervisory power to circumvent rules of criminal procedure).

The

Chambers case has been broadly cited as an independent means to award attorney fees. The
Supreme Court explained its rationale:
The imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a court's equitable power
concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court's inherent power to
police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of vindicating judicial authority
without resmi to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and
making the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's
obstinacy.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court recognized the courts' inherent power "must be
exercised with restraint and discretion" Id. at 44.
Chambers has been cited with approval by this Court on prior occasions. See, e.g., Talbot
v. Ames Const., 127 Idaho 648,651,904 P.2d 560,563 (1995) (noting that "This Court adopted

rules to provide guidance to the courts in the exercise of these inherent powers'" in awarding
attorney fee sanctions under I.A.R.11.1); In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,256,912
P.2d 614, 624 (1995) (recognizing that inherent authority could be used to assess sanction for
bad faith conduct); Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 162, 169-70, 823 P.2d 766, 773-74 (1991) (Boyle,
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J., dissenting). "For the purpose of imposing sanctions, a party acts in bad faith when it willfully
conducts itself improperly or acts with an improper purpose." State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320,
322, 144 P.3d 25, 27 (2006), as amended on denial ofreh'g (Sept. 19, 2006) (citing Fink v.

Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2001).) Other jurisdictions have also sought to define this
"amorphous" power of the courts. See, e.g., Kurtch v. Del ,Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506
(Tx.Ct.App. 1992).
Integral to every consideration of the use of sanctions is the court's exercise of discretion.
In Sheets v. Agro-W., Inc., the Court of Appeals looked at discretion in earnest:
"Discretion" has been defined as a power or privilege to act unhampered by legal
rule. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 553 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). However,
"judicial discretion" is a more restrained concept. Lord Coke is said to have
defined judicial discretion as an inquiry into "what would be just according to the
laws in the premises." Id. Judicial discretion "requires an actual exercise of
judgment and a consideration of the facts and circumstances which are necessary
to make a sound, fair, and just determination, and a knowledge of the facts upon
which the discretion may properly operate." 27 C.J.S. Discretion at 289 (1959).
Discretion which violates these restraints is discretion abused.

Sheets v. Agro-W, Inc., 104 Idaho 880,887,664 P.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App. 1983) (J. Burnett
specially concurring); see also, DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 755-56,
331 P.3d 491, 497-98 (2014) (holding that the process is the focus of the inquiry rather than the
decision itself). It is an abuse of discretion for the court not to "identify and apply the law to the
facts found." Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 528, 746
P .2d 985, 987 (1987). In this case, the district court never identified or applied any legal
authority in rendering sanctions against Sondra. This district court just said it would and it did.
Sanctions should not be used merely for punishment. Sierra Life Ins. V ,Magic Valley
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Newspapers, 101 Idaho 795,799,623 P.2d i03, 107 (1981) (citing Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409,
17 S.Ct 841, 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897) for the proposition that such measures should be used to
compel production of evidence and not for the mere purpose of punishment for contempt). The
record in this case indicate that is exactly what the district court did. Tr., Vol. I, p. 297, I. 20 - p.
299, I. 24. Although the district court acknowledged that Sondra was not disregarding the court
out of sheer defiance, Tr., Vol. I, p. 307, LI. 13-21, the court stated that the dismissal was in part
for her failure to comply with its order. Tr., Vol. I, p. 316, LL 8-15. Before doing so, the district
court clarified and acknowledged that any further conveyance of the property was not needed to
pursue the loan modification. Tr., Vol. I, p. 313, LL 2-22; R., Vol. V, p. 987, ,I 9. The district
court also acknowledged that it was expressly not awarding fees as a sanction. Tr., Vol. I, p. 317,

LL 9-21. Quite simply, there was no need for a deed at the January 13, 2014 hearing other than
as a showing that Sondra had acquiesced to the district court's power. Her actions should not be
deemed to be conducted in "bad faith" as verified by the district court. Thus, there is no reason
her inability to get the deed back should have resulted in the punishment. LaPeter would not
reconvey the property. R., Vol. IV, p. 749, p. 875, ,r 10.
There is just no need in this context and on this record to adopt a strained new process for
the inherent power of the court to sanction. Talbot, 127 Idaho at 652,904 P.2d 564. A trial
court's power to enforce its orders is already manifested in the contempt statutes promulgated by
the legislature, I.C. §§ 7-601, et seq. Using the grant of authority under I.C. § 1-1622, this Court
used its rulemaking authority to fashion I.R.C.P. 75 regarding contempt proceedings. The
penalties for contempt are set forth in LC. § 7-610 and do not include dismissal as an available
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remedy. Additionally, even if it were an available remedy, Sondra would have been entitled to
due process of law and a detennination that she was in contempt in a proper proceeding. Embree
v. Embree, 85 Idaho 443,451,380 P.2d 216,221 (1963); see also, Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co.,
Ltd, 13 7 Idaho 850, 865, 55 P .3d 304, 319 (2002). "Before someone can be found in contempt

for violating a court order, the order must command that person to do or to refrain from doing
something." Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLCv. Keane, 154 Idaho 807,810,303 P.3d 166,169 (2013).
The district court here acknowledged that Sondra was not required at the time of the
conveyance to LaPeter by any prior order of the court to convey her interest to Robert and, thus,
could not be held in contempt on that basis. Tr., Vol. I, p. 255, Ll. 17-25. The district court
acknowledged that it might have been able to initiate contempt proceedings against Sondra for
failing to get the property back from LaPeter but disregarded that process as "quirky" and
"unwieldy". Tr., Vol. I, p. 254, LI. 18-25. However, the district court's interest in punishing her
should have yielded to due process. Sondra respectfully submits that she caused no prejudicial
delay. If the district court's guiding principle was to help these parties dispose of their residence,
Bank of America was processing the loan modification without any further court involvement.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 313, LI. 2-22; R., Vol. V, p. 987, ,r 9, pp. 1001-04.
1. The district court should have considered lesser sanctions.
If pennissible to sanction Sondra, the district court should have made specific finding that

less severe sanctions could not have been adequate before dismissing her counterclaims and
entering judgment against her. Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 529-31, 746 P.2d at 988-90; Fish Haven
Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 121-22, 822 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (Ct.App. 1991). In the
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context of such sanctions under I.R.C.P. 37(b ), the Idaho Appellate Courts have stated:
In order to justify the sanctions of dismissal of pleadings and entry of judgment,
the record below must clearly reflect both delay and ineffective lesser sanctions,
and must be bolstered by at least one "aggravating" factor such as delay which is:
(1) intentional, (2) caused by the plaintiff personally, or (3) results in prejudice to
the other party.
Id, 121 Idaho at 122,822 P.2d at 1019 (citing Ashby v. Western Council, Lumber Production and
Industrial Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686-87, 791 P.2d 434, 436-37 (1990).) This rationale should
apply in this context because the proper focus is on the type of sanction rather than the alleged
misconduct. Fish Haven, 121 Idaho at 121, 822 P .2d at 1018. However, in Day v. CIBA Geigy
Corp., this Court stated that I.R.C.P. 41(b) provides a singular remedy so the trial court need not
consider alternatives. Day, 115 Idaho at 1018, 772 P.2d at 225. Even if the Court were to apply
that rationale in this uncharted territory, Sondra submits that that reference was merely dicta
given that the facts of that case presented a delay of over 6 years.
Warnings have been recognized in conjunction with an award of fees as a lesser sanction.
Ashby, 117 Idaho at 687, 791 P.2s at 437. Sondra does not dispute that the district court warned
her of its intent to impose a sanction. R., Vol. IV, pp. 756,793,908. In this case, however, the
court's warnings were inconsistent and differed from the sanction the court ultimately levied. R.
pp. 756, 793, 908. In the two earlier e-mails, the district court threatened to dismiss the case. R.
pp. 756, 793. At the hearing on December 10, 2013, the district court evolved to a sanction of
precluding Sondra from her right to a jury trial in district court. R. p. 908, Tr., Vol. I, p. 263, 1. 18
- 265, 1. 18. Attorney fees were never ordered as a sanction. At no time was Sondra warned of
the sanctions that were eventually imposed. R., Vol. V, p. 1048. The eventual order was that the
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dismissal was "without prejudice to Sondra's pursuing these same claims (raised in her district
court counterclaim) before Judge Borreson in magistrate's court. This dismissal is a bar, and is
with prejudice, to Sondra raising any of these same claims in district court as a breach of contract
action with a claim for money damages, with or without a claim for a right of trial by jury." Id.
(Emphasis in original). That was different than what the court had ever previously stated it was
going to do. Additionally, the district court itself seemed confused about its ruling when
revisiting the issue at the hearing on attorney fees on April 7, 2014. Tr., Vol. II, p. 6, 1. 16 -p. 7,

1. 19; p. 51, 1. 9

p. 53, 1. 12.

2. The Court's dismissal of Sondra's Counterclaim violates her constitutional right to
access to the Courts.
"[E]very individual in our society has a right to access the courts." Eisman v. Miller, l O1
Idaho 692, 697, 619 P.2d 1145, 1150 (1980). This Court recently revisited the issue of dismissal
in the context of contempt. State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 311 P.3d
286 (2013). In so doing, the Court held that "both the refusal to hear a motion and the dismissal
of a motion on the ground that a contemnor has not purged contempt violates Article I, § 18 of
the Idaho Constitution." Id., 155 Idaho at 279, 311 P.3d at 291. Sondra acknowledges that this is
not a contempt proceeding and that this Court in Eisman held that the right was not infinite.
Eisman, l 0 1 Idaho 697, 619 P .2d 1150 (holding the "right cannot be allowed to rise to the level

of abuse, impeding the normal and essential functioning of the judicial process.")
The holding in Eisman is well reasoned and congruent with the decisions in Ashby,
Astorquia, Fitzgerald and Fish Haven, supra. Central to each of those cases is prejudicial delay
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that disrupts the judicial process.

focus of the analysis is not on the prejudice to the court

but rather to the litigant. The trial court '"must balance the equities by comparing the culpability
of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party."' Roe v. Doe, 129
Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 532, 746
P.2d at 990). In this case, there was no balancing of the equities and no finding of any prejudice
to Robert. To the contrary, the record clearly indicates that Robert was not prejudiced at all. Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 299, LL 3-17; p. 313, LL 2-22; R., Vol. V, p. 987, ,I 9, pp. 1001-04. Even if the district
court were permitted to alter the parties' PSA to allow the pursuit of a loan modification to the
exclusion of the Augusts proposed short sale, Bank of America was actively processing the loan
modification that Robert wanted. Id.
In considering that argument, the district court stated, in pertinent part:
I have read your brief and I read your affidavits, and I see there is some
argument, well, the Bank of America doesn't need this, it doesn't need this deed
from Mr. [sic} Kantor. And my response to that is, well, I don't know what Mr.
Kantor 's game is, whether there's a deed needed or not. Maybe there's some
question about that.
But I !mow what her game is, and her game is she has not done what I've
told her to do. And that hasn't changed. So that's why I still think I'm inclined to
dismiss this case as least in part because of-for sanctions.

Tr., Vol. I., p. 299, LL 11-22. The district court's focus upon itself was in error.
Furthennore, the district court's proposed sanction violates her constitutional right to a
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jury trial.
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths
of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases
of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury may
be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open
court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner
as may be prescribed by law.
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. Sondra fully believes that the PSA has been merged into the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce but it is nevertheless foreseeable that there could be further

litigation between these parties in their business holdings. Sondra should not be deprived of her
right to access the district court "with or without" a jury trial. The district court's sanctions
should be vacated.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION FOLLOWING

THE MERGER.
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is
capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Ameritel Inns, Inc. v.
Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849,851, 119 P.3d 624,626 (2005). On October 18,

2013, Sondra filed a Notice of Submission of the Property Settlement Agreement and Motion that
it be Incorporated as a Supplemental Judgment of the Court together with a supporting affidavit

in the original divorce proceeding. R., Vol. IV, pp. 848-51. Sondra's actions were based on
Paragraph 24 of the PSA, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
... However, if either party believes there is a need to seek court involvement with
regard to any provision, that party may submit this agreement to the court and upon
request the court shall incorporate this agreement as a supplemental judgment of the

Appellant's Brief

pg.32

court.
R., Vol. I, p. 39.
In the previously filed divorce action, Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-525, Judge
Borreson ruled on December 20, 2013 that the divorce court had jurisdiction and that the PSA
was merged into a Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered nunc pro tune for October 18, 2013.
R., Vol. V, p. 935, ,i,i 1-2. The merger resulted in the loss of jurisdiction by the district court over
the PSA and the end to the present suit. The district court's jurisdiction may be extinguished by
some event during the course of litigation. McHugh v. A1cHugh, 115 Idaho 198, 199, 766 P.2d
133, 134 (1988); Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41, 720 P.2d 223,224 (Ct. App. 1986). The
loss of jurisdiction invalidated any further determination by the district court. See, e.g., State v.
Wo[fe,

P.3d _, 2013 \VL 6014054, pp. 11-12 (Ct.App.2013); Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho

193,197,307 P.3d 1219, 1223 (2013); Tr., Vol. II, p. 51, I. 9-p. 52, I. 7.
A question regarding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
Fisher v. Crest Corp., 112 Idaho 741, 744, 735 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Ct. App. 1987). The question
of jmisdiction is fundamental and must not be ignored. Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., 132
Idaho 145, 148, 968 P.2d 240, 243 (1998). Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement in
determining the justiciability of a claim and cannot be waived by consent of the parties. Troupis,
148 Idaho at 79-80, 218 P.3d at 1140-41. Jurisdiction depends upon the right of the court to
exercise judicial power over that class of cases to which the particular case before it belongs and
not upon whether the particular case states a cause of action upon its specific facts. Id., (citing
Richardson v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, 98 P. 842, 844-45 (1908)). The district court case was an
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action upon the marital PSA -not an action upon the property. Tr. pp. 21

19; I.C. § §

514( a)( c)( e ); LR. C.P. 9(i). Once merged, all of the breach of contract actions on the PSA in this
matter become moot.
"Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under the judgment or the decree for those
under the agreement or cause of action sued upon" Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 230,
296 P.3d 433, 436 (Ct.App.2013) (quoting Kimball v. Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 15, 356 P.2d 919,
921 (1960)).

The right to enforce the contract through a breach of contract action was

supplanted by the divorce trial court's authority to enforce its order. Id. LC. § 1-2201. In this
case, the power to enforce the PSA was and is relegated to the trial court in Blaine County Case
No. CV-2011-525 -now with the Honorable Thomas Borreson presiding. I.C. §§ 1-2201, l2210(1)(d), 1-2214; I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(C); Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 345-46, 336
P.3d 275, 278-79 (2014); F{fth Judicial District Administrative Order dated March 23, 2009
(Hon. Barry Wood). The district court struggled mightily with which court should preside over
the case and the jurisdictional issues.

"Divisional jurisdiction" is dealt with in Idaho in

accordance with the above-referenced authorities. Id. In considering this issue of merger, it is
important to note two things: 1) Sondra requested the merger on October 18, 2013 - a full month
before the district ordered her to tender a deed or announced its intent to impose the sanctions
contemplated herein; and, 2) the district court itself raised the question of the status of the merger
throughout the proceedings and in the e-mail. R., Vol. IV, p. 755; Tr., Vol. I, p. 217, 1. 23 - p.
218, 1. 3; p. 246, 1. 5-p. 247, 1. 5; p. 258, 1. 21-p. 259, 1. 4; p. 260, 1. 7-p. 261, I. 8.
The magistrate court, having previously been vested with jurisdiction over the parties,
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to exercise that jurisdiction and that alone was a sufficient legal basis for the district
court to take no further action. I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). R., Vol. V, p. 936-937,

il 5.

The district comi

failed to consider that the divorce case had gone to judgment, and, as a second-tier, whether the
district court should otherwise have refrained from deciding it as a matter of discretion. Klaue v.

Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 439-40, 988 P.2d 211, 213-14 (1999). Essentially, the magistrate court had
already ruled upon the disposition of the home. See, e.g., A1cBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho 959,
961, 739 P.2d 258, 269 (1987) (holding that in the absence of a timely appeal, the property
division set forth by decree are "final, res judicata, and no jurisdiction exists to modify property
divisions of a divorce decree."); Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 376, 870 P.2d 1331, 1335
(Ct.App.1993). The district court again failed to identify and apply the correct legal standard to
the problem. Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 528, 746 P.2d at 987. Accordingly, the district court erred
by taking further action in this case following the merger.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT ROBERT'S

CASE IN CHIEF WAS CONCLUDED.
The district court ultimately determined that Robert's case was resolved completely in his
favor. R., Vol. V, p. 1051. This finding is at odds with the district court's initial ruling on the
motion for pmiial summary judgment. R., Vol. II, p. 455. A plaintiff asserting a cause of action
for breach of contract must establish the existence of a valid contract and its breach. Melaleuca.

Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920,924, 318.P.3d 910,914 (2014). The plaintiff must establish not
only that he was legally ,vronged but also that he was economically injured. Id.
and the fact of the damage must be proven beyond speculation. Id.
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The measure

In the hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment, the district comi noted that
Robert's argument evolved from contractual damages related to the short sale to one involving a
claim for attorney fees instead. Tr., Vol. I, p. 48, Ll. 3-20; Tr., Vol. II, p. 54, LI. 14-25.
However, it is clear that Sondra prevailed on the part of Robert's claim that alleged she breached
the PSA that led to the failure of the first short sale and damages "in excess of $10,000" as
prayed for his Complaint. Tr., Vol. I, p. 50, I. 20 - p. 52, 1. 8. The initial short sale was
terminated by Bank of America unrelated to any action by Sondra. Id Nevertheless, the district
court stated Sondra's actions "provoked" a claim for attorney fees, which it deemed a judge
issue. Id. Cost and attorney fees are collateral issues that to not go to the merits of an action.
Inland Group o.fCompanies v. Obend01ff, 131 Idaho 473,475,959 P.2d 454,456 (1998).

If such fees and costs were deemed to have gone to the merits of the action, the issue of
causation still lingered as a triable issue of fact with regard to the attorney fee issue. Tr., Vol. I,
p. 50, 1. 20 - p. 52, 1. 8. The district court should have submitted to a jury the issue of whether
Sondra not signing caused Robe1i to incur any attorney fees and, if so, how much. In this
particular case, it is irreconcilable to say that the attorney fees are the damage but then contend
that a jury cannot decide on the causation issue or the damage amount. A jury may very well
have concluded that Robert did not suffer any attorney fee damages because Sondra signed
within two hours of the Complaint being filed and before she was served with the suit. The jury
also could have determined that the attorney fees amount was a nominal amount, which would
have direct bearing on any "prevailing party'' or "losing party" analysis. Attorney fees could
range from a few hundred dollars to a merely a few thousand as opposed to the over $19,000
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awarded to Robert.

e.g., Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262,266,899 P.2d 972,976 (1995)

(holding only attorney fees recoverable as damages are those directly attributable to cause of
action).
In this case, the suit could have dismissed essentially the same day based upon Sondra's
execution of the documents pertaining to the first short sale. Rather than do that, Robert
persisted in the pursuit of his claims. Regarding Robe1i's claim for injunctive relief to compel
Sondra's performance with the short sale, it was rendered moot before she was ever served.
Furthennore, it was Robert that refused to cooperate with the short sale process as the case wore
on. Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 900, 204 P .3d at 540. Robert did not prevail on his request for
injunctive relief compelling Sondra's cooperation with the short sale. Thus, the district court
erred in concluding that Robert's case in chief was resolved in his favor.
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST SONDRA.
Additionally, the district comi vvTongfully determined that Robe1i did not violate the PSA
by making only minimum credit card payments. R., Vol. V, p. 1051; Tr., Vol. L p. 56, l. 4 - p.
60, 1. 6. Ironically, the district court's rationale was that it did not have the authority to rev,Tite
the PSA. Id. When a contract does not include a time for performance, the law may impose a
reasonable time for its perfonnance. Hull, 156 Idaho at 778, 331 P.3d at 520. Sondra presented
evidence that by Robert making only minimum payments, the credit cards would take 35 years to
pay off-when he was 108 years old. Tr., Vol. I, p. 38. LI. 3-19. She also provided evidence that
he had missed one payment. R., Vol. II, p. 318, ~ 3; p. 420. Drawing the inferences in Sondra's
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, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Robert on this issue.
Additionally, the district court inexplicably granted leave to Sondra to file an amended
counterclaim on that issue. R., Vol. III, p. 569-70, ~,i 41-46.
The district court also granted summary judgment to Robert on the Exclusive Resorts
password in error. Tr., Vol. I, p. 54, LL 18-24. Robert did not even move for summary judgment
on this issue. R., Vol. L p. 170. The district comi asked Sondra's counsel, Mr. Williams, about
the status of the password during the June 2013 hearing. Tr., Vol. I, p. 46, LI. 5-24. Mr.
Williams stated that he thought the parties resolved the issue of the password for Exclusive
Resorts as the parties had agreed to list it for sale. Id Sua sponte, the district comi ruled in favor
of Robert on that issue. Id However, if the issue existed at the time the litigation commenced but
was resolved, how is it equitable or just that the district rule in Robert's favor on that issue? Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 59, LL 1-19. Again, that is inconsistent with the logic the district comi applied to
Sondra's alleged failure to sign the sh01i sale extension documents. Robert should not be
deemed to have prevailed on that issue.
The district court wrongfully concluded it granted summary judgment on usage of the
community airline miles. Tr., Vol. I, p. 53, 1. 23 - p. 54, L 23. Under the PSA and a subsequent
agreement, Robert was supposed to transfer a specified amount of airline miles. R., Vol. I, p. 36,
,i 15; p. 62. That issue still stood as a triable issue between the pmiies. Tr., Vol. I, p. 67, l. 6 - p.
68, 1. 19. Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on that issue.

F.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AW ARD ING ATTORNEY FEES TO

ROBERT.
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The district court awarded $19,334.53 in attorney fees to Robert. Supp.R., Vol. I, pp.
131-32. The attorney fee award bore no relation to the alleged harm in the breach of contract
action. Koelker, 127 Idaho at 266, 899 P.2d at 976. The trial court may award reasonable
attorney fees in a civil action "when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54( e)(l ).
It is well settled that a party claiming attorney fees must assert the specific contractual provision,

statute, rule, or case authority for its claim. Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Prop., LLC, 148 Idaho
638, 641-42, 227 P.3d 568, 571-72 (2009); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,438, 80 P.3d
1031, 1039 (2003); A1DS Investments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,465, 65 P.3d 197,206
(2003). A generalized request for attorney fees is not sufficient. Garner, 139 Idaho at 438. "[I]t
is incumbent on the moving party to assert the grounds upon which it seeks an award of attorney
fees. The district judge is not empowered to award fees on a basis not asserted by the moving
party." Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc,., 133 Idaho 420,424, 987 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999).
The awarding of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Henderson, 148 Idaho at 639, 227 P.3d at 569; Chavez v.
Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,224, 192 P.3d 1036, 1048 (2008).
Robert asserted two separate grounds to the district court to support his claim for an
award of attorney fees, which were I.C. § 12-121 and the PSA. Supp.R., Vol. I, p. 37. The
district court correctly concluded that fees were not warranted under J.C.§ 12-121. Tr., Vol. II,
p. 55, LL 7-15. The district court also did not award attorney fees as a sanction against Sondra.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 317, LI. 9-21. The award of attorney fees by the district court was based on the
PSA. Tr., Vol. II, p. 55, LL 2-6.
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\Vhen a party moves for attorney fees under a contract, the te1ms of

contract control

any right to attorney fees. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 186, 75 P.3d 743, 747
(2003). Paragraph [29].03 provides that "If action is instituted to enforce any of the te1ms of this
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party all costs and attorneys' fees
in that action". R., Vol. I, p. 40, ,I 29. At the trial court level, the parties alleged claims against
one another -some of which are yet to be resolved. Supp.R., Vol. I, pp. 115-124. The district
court found that Sondra did not cause the initial short sale to fail, which was the only breach of
contract claim pled by Robert. Tr., Vol. I, p. 50, I. 23 -p. 51, I. 23. Specifically, the district
comi stated:
So, I am not going to rule that-and this is another facet of the breach of
contract. I am not going to rule that she, because of the issue of causation, that
Ms. Kantor breached the contract for purposes of general contract damages. I
v,:ant to be ve1y clear. I'm not going to rule that she breached the contract for
pwposes c?fgeneral contract damages because there is an issue c1f causation. S'he
didn't sign the document right away. but it didn't cause any harm except for it
provoked a claim for attorney 'sfees.
So plaintiff's claim - I ·will deny the motion for summmy judgment insofar
as it seeks any contract damages because there ·s an issue ~ffact as to 1vhether
anything she did, quote, unquote, caused a breach of contract. There's an issue
of causation. There's an issue cf materiality by not signing. It didn "t harm
anything. That contract fell apart because there wasn't an appraisal. There was
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a

purchase and sale agreement.
So her not signing did not cause the contract -and I want that underlined,

did not cause contract damages. It did provoke a claim/or.fees, I'll rule on that,
but that's ajudge issue, it's not ajury issue. so this issue ,von 't go to thejury.
That's an issue for the Court to determine ii·ho the prevailing party is and
whether someone gets.fees under a contract, under the divorce contract, or by
statute or.for some other reason. . . .Id.

As set forth above and for the same reasons incorporated herein, there is no prevailing
party in "that action". I.R.C.P. 3. The district court even acknowledged the action was never
resolved. Tr., Vol. II, p. 58, LL 4-6. There can be no prevailing party until the merits of the
lawsuit have been decided and there is a final judgment. Howard v. Peny, 141 Idaho 139, 143,
106P.3d465,469(2009);Straubv. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71-72, 175 P.3d 754, 760-61
(2007) (Jones, J., Horton, J., Eismann, J., concurring). Accordingly, an award of attorney fees
under the contract is not appropriate. In deten11ining the prevailing party, the court "shall in its
sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B); I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (referring back to Rule
54(d)(l)(B) for determining the prevailing party when deciding entitlement to attorney fees);
Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Haught, 146 Idaho 300, 305, 193 P.3d 460,465 (Ct.App. 2008).

"Mere dismissal of a claim without a trial does not necessarily mean that the party against whom
the claim was made is a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding costs and fees." Chene1y v.
Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,692,682 P.2d 640,645 (Ct.App. 1984). Attorney fees may be
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awarded even if the case is not fully decided on the merits only in limited circumstances. Allied

Bail Bonds. Inc. v. County o.f Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405,414, 258 P.3d 340, 349 (2011 ).
When an action is dismissed "with prejudice," there is essentially adjudication on the
merits of the claim, and the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or cause is
extinguished. Straub, 145 Idaho at 73, 175 P.3d at 762. The dismissal of the action with
prejudice can be a prerequisite of the right to recover court costs and attorney fees. Id. The
distinction between a dismissal with or without prejudice is crucial in this case. Although
confusing, the district court ruled several times that the dismissal of Sondra's counterclaims was
without prejudice as to the merits of her claim. Tr., Vol. II, p. 6, LL 16-23; p. 7, LL 13-19; p. 51,

I. 9 p. 52, 1. 17; p. 53, LL 1-12; p. 65, L8-10; p. 66, LI. 2-18. The district court attempted to
limit or restrict her ability and manner to bring a claim for damages in district court. Id., R., Vol.
V, p. 1048. However, her right to bring the claim has not been extinguished. "The words 'with
prejudice' mean '[w]ith ioss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of a party's claim and
bars any future action on that claim."' Straub, 145 Idaho at 73-74, 175 P.3d at 762-63 (J. Jones
dissenting, in part) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed.1999).)
In Straub, the plaintiffs attorney had presented a stipulation of dismissal "with prejudice"
to defendant, but the stipulation was silent as to an award of costs and attorney fees. Straub, 145
Idaho at 67, 175 P.3d at 756. The trial court entered an order that dismissed the case and stated
there would be no award of fees and costs. Id., 145 Idaho at 68, 175 P.3d at 757. This Court
reversed the entry of the lower court's order that had ordered each party to bear their own costs
and fees, and remanded the matter to the lower court for consideration of an award of fees and
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costs. Id., 145 Idaho at 71, 175 P.3d at 760; See also, Eighteen Mile Ranch, 141 Idaho at 719,
117 P .3d at 13 3 (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice of all claims based upon the parties'
stipulation is "the most favorable outcome" and justified a conclusion that the defendant
prevailed).
Incontrast,inPuckettv. Verska, 144Idaho 161,170, 158P.3d937,946(2007),the

dismissal of a claim was without prejudice. The defendant claimed the district court erred when
it refused to award costs and fees to him after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed one of her
claims and the first trial was declared a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied costs and attorney fees
because no final judgment was entered after the first trial and the plaintiffs claim was dismissed
without prejudice, leaving her free to pursue it. Id. This Court upheld the district court's
determination. Id. at 946. See also, Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689,693,800 P.2d 85, 89 (Ct.App.
1989) (upholding denial of defendant's request for attorney fees when plaintiff had voluntarily
dismissed the action and the resulting order was without prejudice). The district court left
Sondra free to bring her claims before the magistrate court. Thus, regardless of whether or not
the Court overturns the sanctions, the district court should have declined to award fees in this
case. The district court acknowledged those matters had not been adjudicated. Tr., Vol. II, p. 6,
LL 16-23; p. 7, LL 13-19; p. 51, I. 9-p. 52, 1. 17; p. 53, LI. 1-12; p. 65, L8-10; p. 66, LL 2-18.

V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Sondra respectfully requests that the decision by district court to dismiss
her counterclaims as a sanction be set aside. There is no need to remand this case for further
proceedings as this Court can simply rule that the dismissal as a sanction was in err but the
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concurrent grounds for dismissal was proper. Additionally, the attorney fee award should be
vacated.

VI. ATTORt~EY FEES AND COSTS
Additionally, Sondra asks that this Court order Robert to pay her attorney fees and costs
on this appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41. Sondra's claim for fees and cost is based upon LC.§ 12-121
and Paragraph 29 of the PSA. As to I.C. § 12-121, Sondra acknowledges that even though this is
a matter of first impression, in part, that the district court's findings were so clearly in error that
any defense of this matter is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Gonzalez v.

Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 884, 231 P.3d 524, 529 (2009); Contra, Taylor v. AJA Services Corp.,
151 Idaho 552,574,261 P.3d 829,851 (2011). With regard to the claim for fees under the PSA,
Sondra asserts a claim recognizing that the Court may conclude ( as she urges it to do) that the
action is not concluded. Accord, Puckett, 144 Idaho at 170, 158 P.3d at 946. However, Sondra
contends that should she prevail on this Appeal, that the Court can nevertheless award her fees
and costs regarding this appeal. Allied Bail Bonds, 151 Idaho at 414,258 P.3d at 349.
~
DATED this ~-__.,-_day of January, 2015.
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF ANDERSON,
WILKINSON & BIRCH, PLLC

By~~
Attorney for Appellant, Sondra Kantor
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Marty R. Anderson

Scot M. Ludwig, Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER MILLER
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209 West Main Street
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